In 2007, a group presided by Felipe González was set up to write a report on “the future of Europe”, which was delivered to the European Counsel on June 17th. One understands that right now the priorities may be concentrated on finding parades to the attacks of the markets, rather than to envision the distant future of the Union. But this report is capital in more than one way. First because the relief that followed the signature of the Lisbon Treaty gave place to the question of what to do in the next twenty years. Second because the financial crisis obviously imposes to reform the European model of governance and the European policies. (in French)

The European Commission has just released gloomy, updated macroeconomic forecasts, with Euro area GDP now projected to decline by 1.9% in 2009. In eleven out of 16 Member states, GDP is expected to fall in 2009, with an especially sharp decline in Ireland (-5%). Due to automatic stabilizers and fiscal stimulation plans, half of the countries are expected to run fiscal deficits exceeding the 3%-of-GDP red line. The European Commission forecasts very large deficits in Ireland (11% of GDP) and in Spain (6.2%). Strikingly, these two countries used to be part of the most virtuous members of the Euro area until 2007. Indeed, from 1999 to 2007, none of these two reached or even approached the 3% bound. General government budget was close to balance on average in Spain while Ireland ran a 1.6% surplus on average. All other Euro Members except Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg crossed the red line at least once, and five of them (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal) did it several times.

In the 1990s, a number of European countries undertook far-reaching labour market reforms to combat high unemployment. At their heart, these reforms were essentially a “carrot & stick” approach, where the “carrot” consisted of (mandatory) activation measures such as job search assistance, on-the-job training, or subsidized employment, while the “stick” consisted of sanctions on unemployment benefits for failure to comply with job search requirements. Specific sanctions ranged from the short-term discontinuation of benefits to permanent and in some cases substantial benefits reductions. As I read the current evaluation literature especially combinations of “assistance and sanctions” were successful in increasing the exit rate to work.

The prescriptions of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty which proved to be the least controversial were, paradoxically, those in the field of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The arrangements agreed to in Berlin last weekend represent little change from the 2004 text. The most important elements are the creation of the new post of “High Representative”, the post of President of the Council and the development of a European diplomatic service. These measures will not, by themselves, turn the EU into a new type of international power-broker, but they will help the Union formulate joint policy and, above all, will assist in the coherent presentation of that policy to the outside world.

Formal criteria don’t define the limits of Europe; they only delay the membership of determined applicants. The true limit is the EU’s capacity to absorb newcomers. Eastern enlargement challenged this capacity, but the forthcoming institutional reforms that allow the EU27 to function will – quite inadvertently – make it easier to enlarge the EU further. EU42 anyone?

The new Dutch government has broken the silence on the future of the European Constitution since the negative referendum vote almost two years ago. Prime Minister Balkenende understands that further silence will have a cumulative and corrosive impact on the public support of European integration at home and abroad. The letter to the Parliament in The Hague addresses the recent fear for a European “superstate” of the Dutch people. Dutch diplomats are instructed to make the case for better regulation, fair burden sharing, and transparency of multi-level policymaking. The letter does not mention the fear for erratic Dutch diplomacy of European authorities and other national governments.

The EU started life in circumstances that are almost unimaginable in today’s world. These irreproducible circumstances led to the creation of supranational institutions and rules – the 1957 Treaty of Rome – that are central to almost all of the EU’s difficulties as well as much of its strength. It also accounts for the fact that European integration has rarely stalled or been reversed.